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Abstract
This article addresses some implications for gender equality and gender policy at European
and national levels of transformations in family, economy and polity, which challenge gender
regimes across Europe. Women’s labour market participation in the west and the collapse
of communism in the east have undermined the systems and assumptions of western male
breadwinner and dual worker models of central and eastern Europe. Political reworking of the
work/welfare relationship into active welfare has individualised responsibility. Individualisation
is a key trend west − and in some respects east − and challenges the structures that supported
care in state and family. The links that joined men to women, cash to care, incomes to carers
have all been fractured. The article will argue that care work and unpaid care workers are
both casualties of these developments. Social, political and economic changes have not been
matched by the development of new gender models at the national level. And while EU
gender policy has been admired as the most innovative aspect of its social policy, gender
equality is far from achieved: women’s incomes across Europe are well below men’s; policies for
supporting unpaid care work have developed modestly compared with labour market activation
policies. Enlargement brings new challenges as it draws together gender regimes with contrasting
histories and trajectories. The article will map social policies for gender equality across the key
elements of gender regimes – paid work, care work, income, time and voice – and discuss
the nature of a model of gender equality that would bring gender equality across these. It
analyses ideas about a dual earner–dual carer model, in the Dutch combination scenario and
‘universal caregiver’ models, at household and civil society levels. These offer a starting point
for a model in which paid and unpaid work are equally valued and equally shared between men
and women, but we argue that a citizenship model, in which paid and unpaid work obligations
are underpinned by social rights, is more likely to achieve gender equality.
Introduction
This article addresses some implications of transformations which challenge
gender regimes across Europe. Gender regimes are seen as the key policy logics
of welfare states in relation to gender. Challenges to the male breadwinner model
have been widely noted. Equally, though less widely discussed, the dual worker
model of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been undermined since the
collapse of communism by economic insecurity, with higher unemployment
bringing an increase in women’s dependence on men’s incomes, and by changes
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in the state, especially reductions in legitimacy and in collective spending. The
article will argue that these transformations in family, economy and polity have
not been matched by new gender models. Widespread anxiety about reconciling
work and family does not amount to widespread reconstruction of the systems
underpinning welfare states’ treatment of men and women, work and care. We
shall map developing policies for gender equality across five components of
gender regimes − paid work, care, income, time and voice – and argue the need
for gender equality policies to be built across all component parts. We shall also
consider these interventions in terms of different levels of intervention, at the
individual, household, civil society and collective/social, and argue the continuing
need for collectivity in care in the midst of markets, a model of gender based on
citizenship, with obligations to care underpinned by rights to social support.
Individualisation of personal and public life is a key trend east and west, and
challenges the structures that supported children and care in state and family.
Market individualism has attacked the collective assumptions of western welfare
states and the whole way of life of the planned economies of former communist
countries. Social individualism – ‘the pressure to put a life together under often
contradictory and often incompatible conditions’ − is a feature of the east as
well as west (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 126). Women have fought to be
treated as individuals. Individualisation may be especially potent for women,
with liberation from traditional assumptions. But how can individualism be
meshed with care? Gender regimes in the soviet era assumed equality of men and
women as individuals in marriage and work, but were underpinned by collective
assumptions about care. What kind of policies will create gender equality in the
new wider Europe? Our aim is to transcend ‘a woman-friendly policy approach’
as a ‘precondition for a productive post-industrial society’ (Esping-Andersen
et al., 2002: 94), and to map gender equality policies across a wider spectrum,
constructing a holistic policy agenda.
Challenges to Western European models
The male breadwinner/female carer model, underpinning welfare policies of most
Western European countries in the post-war era has been undermined by women’s
increasing labour market participation, political reworking of welfare/work
relations, and family transformations, especially increasing divorce. Women’s –
especially mothers’ – labour market participation has been rising across most
of Western Europe (Eurostat, 2000: 34). The decline of marriage and increase of
births outside marriage undermine a male breadwinner system, which depended
on low rates of divorce and of illegitimacy (Creighton, 1999: 525). The male
breadwinner ideal has widely declined (Crompton, 1999; Lewis, 2001a). In the
UK, the Beveridgean male breadwinner model underpinned policy from the 1940s
to the 1970s, and the Thatcher era still saw motherhood as women’s first social
obligation. New Labour has assumed that social obligation means paid work;
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but – despite expansion of care services − this great transition from careforce to
workforce has modest social support and fragmented arrangements for childcare
(Lewis, 2001b, 2002a; Moss, 2001; Land, 2002a, 2002b). No Western European
country has put women on equal terms with men: even Scandinavian countries
have labour market divisions which put women at a disadvantage in paid work
and pensions, and discourage men’s participation in care work.
Changing CEE dual earner model
What was the character of the gender regimes of CEE countries under socialism?
Soviet policy challenged the male breadwinner model, identifying women’s
exclusion from paid employment as a key to their oppression and encouraging
women to work outside the home (as well as in it) (Molyneux, 1990). Women’s
labour was crucial to economic development, and enabled through education,
workplace social provision and state guaranteed parental leave and benefits,
kindergartens and nurseries, and laws about marriage and the family that framed
women as equal individuals (Fajth, 1996; UNICEF, 1998, 1999).
The gender regimes of the communist era appeared on the surface like
Scandinavian ones, with women’s high labour market participation and low
gender pay gaps. At the point of transition, women’s labour market participation
rates were around 80 per cent in Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania,
and around 70per cent in Poland, Hungary and Romania. The gender pay gap was
11 per cent in Hungary and 13 per cent in Poland (UNICEF, 1999: 24, 2001: 14). But
the experience of gender equality as an imposition of authoritarian governments,
rather than as an objective of social movements, made communist dual earner
regimes feel very different from the inside:
Because of the impossibility of free public discourse gender relations never became a public
issue. In public life, work, studies, culture, and politics, women had become (almost) equal,
and they may have felt (almost) equal. But in the private sphere, in partner relations, within the
family and the interpersonal arena, traditional ways of constructing men and women’s roles
remained, by and large, untouched. (Ferge, 1998: 221)
No civil society, and no pressures to bring men into household and care work
in former soviet countries, brought distinctive regimes: these combined social
and legal provisions supporting women’s labour market participation, and legal
equalities in marriage and divorce, with extreme domestic inequality, evidenced
quantitatively by time use data (UNICEF, 1999; Gershuny, 2000).
Have the transformations since 1989 brought ‘retraditionalisation’, a
reversion to the male breadwinner model? In Poland, in particular, this case
can be argued, as a consequence of the strength of the Catholic Church and
Solidarity, and the reaction against soviet domination. Abortion has been much
debated, and is now restricted except in exceptional cases. One of Solidarity’s
first actions was to cut maternity leave and leave benefits. Reduced from six
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months’ full pay, six months’ reduced pay, and six years’ unpaid leave under
communism, mothers in the public sector can take six months with reduced
pay, while in the private sector they may not be eligible at all (Bystydzienski,
2003). Education has not protected women’s jobs, and there is an increase in the
proportion describing themselves as keeping house (Glass and Kawachi, 2001).
Current figures show women’s employment rates mainly below the EU average:
women’s ‘relatively favourable position in the labour market, which had made
the region comparable to Sweden, the leader in the West in this regard, is now a
phenomenon of the past in most transition countries’ (UNICEF, 2001: 14). Men
have lost jobs too, and a return to male breadwinner households cannot be read
off from these data, but men’s employment rates across CEE accession countries
are now above women’s (Eurostat, 2001a: 17).
The transition from communism threatens many aspects of the dual earner
systems of CEE countries, with changes in GDPs, the ability to raise taxation, and
ideological support for state services. The gender regimes of the soviet era were
built on very high levels of public expenditure of around 55 per cent of GDP in
the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. The comparable figures now
are 45 per cent in CE and 40 per cent in SEE (UNICEF, 2001: 13−16), leading to
reduced spending on child care, education, health, pensions and child benefits,
and pluralisation of welfare instruments (Ferge and Tausz, 2002). But several
CEE accession countries have retained their strong tradition of state involvement
in childcare. Social spending cuts have tended to close state nurseries, but the
tradition of pre-primary school enrolment has been sustained, albeit unevenly:
Hungary has 87.3 per cent of 3−6 year-olds enrolled and the Czech Republic 85.4
per cent, while Poland has the lowest number enrolled at 49.9 per cent (UNICEF,
2001: 147; Walters, 2003): gender regimes in this respect are close to Scandinavia
in style, albeit at much lower living standards.
Transition to market-based democracy brings transition to a new gender
order, and poses critical practical dilemmas over parenthood and care: ‘With the
retreat of the state from daily life, these societies must now fill in the blanks in
the interdependent arrangement of work and family’ (UNICEF, 1999: 57). But
the new arrangements emerging may not just be a return to traditional models.
Most discussion has focused on paid work and on politics. But, from inside
households, there begins to emerge evidence for a more equal distribution of
care work, in radical transformation from the strongly gender stereotypical roles
of the communist era. The European Foundation now finds a more egalitarian
distribution of care in the 12 Accession and Candidate Countries than appears
on average elsewhere in Europe, with 31 per cent of men involved in raising and
caring for children, compared with 24 per cent in the EU (Paoli and Parent-
Thirion, 2003: 78). These changes appear particularly associated with younger
men (Bystydzienski, 2003). The combination of continued state provision for
young children, with changing gender practices within younger households,
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suggests that CEE countries are not going back to the past, but are developing
something new, which could bring more gender equality, with deeper social roots
than under communism.
Gender regimes in a wider EU
Gender regimes at the national level are increasingly influenced by EU-level
legislation, where the politics of reconciling work and family have gained
increasing purchase (Williams, 2001; Duncan, 2002). Concern with the domestic
gender relations that underpin work inequalities appears in Directives on Part-
time work, Working Time and Parental Leave and on research on reconciling work
and family (European Commission, 1999; Neilson, 1998; Rossilli, 1999, 2000). The
Social Policy Agenda asks the social partners to ‘strengthen their dialogue with
particular attention to . . . reconciliation between family and working life’ and
aims to prepare the enlargement of the Union under conditions of ‘balanced
economic and social development’ (European Commission, 2000: 21−2).
Balanced gender development is a major challenge. Former communist
countries risk being absorbed within western paradigms, which will not support
care work or household incomes, while incomes remain low by western standards
and the private solutions adopted by the better-off people in better-off countries
will be generally unavailable. The example of the former GDR offers a foretaste of
the likely consequences of absorbing former soviet societies into western models
of social policy: having children at all has become laden with dilemmas (Beck and
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). The level of integration involved in merging the former
East and West Germany is not to be expected from EU enlargement. But some
convergence will occur and will have implications for CEE gender regimes.
The social implications of this ‘historic enlargement’ (D-G, 2000: 2) have
received little attention (Hantrais, 2002a; Pascall and Manning, 2002). It joins
countries with contrasting gender regimes. While Malta retains a traditional male
breadwinner regime, CEE countries − ten from the former soviet region, with
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia members from 2004 – have had legislation supporting women as paid
employees and mothers, pre-dating Scandinavia.
Gender models in the new Europe
If both the key models − East and West − for connecting paid work and family,
incomes and unpaid work, are crumbling, are there alternatives?
More debates concern the aftermath of the western male breadwinner model
than the future of the dual earner model in CEE countries (Crompton, 1999;
Fraser, 1997; Lewis 2001a, 2001b; Gornick and Meyers, 2003). These may be
analysed into models based on different levels of intervention in policies for
gender equality. The most individual, represented currently by the US (and to
some extent Britain) offers women as individuals the right to gender equality
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at work, but limited public responsibility for the costs of children brings
‘problems of income and time poverty, gender inequality, questionable child
care arrangements, and poor outcomes for children’. Its ‘exceptionally private
conception of family life leaves American families to craft individual solutions to
what is essentially a social dilemma: if everyone is at the workplace, who will care
for the children?’ (Gornick and Meyers, 2003: 8). The authors make a powerful
case for the US to move from its individualist assumptions.
A model of intervention for gender equality at the household level is the
Netherlands’ ‘Combination Scenario’, set out in a White Paper in 1997, and
intended to bring equality of unpaid work by 2010. This offers a new direction,
with the aim that men and women should equally be able to combine paid and
unpaid work, thus bringing men into unpaid work, as well as bringing women into
paid. This involves a range of policies, including changes in taxation policy, and
policies on working time. Reality remains a long way from the ideal that paid and
unpaid work should be equally valued and shared, with mothers much more likely
than fathers to do part-time work, though policies on working hours (below)
make a significant contribution (Knijn, 2001; Lewis; 2002a; Mutari and Figart,
2001; Plantenga, 2002). We shall argue that redistribution of care work at the
household level is a crucial component of any future model, but some households
have more resources for care than others: a model of gender equality needs to look
at the distribution of responsibility between households as well as within them.
At the level of civil society, Fraser argues for a ‘universal caregiver’ approach
in which all employees would be assumed to have care responsibilities. Some
care would take place in households, and some in state-funded settings, but there
would also be major developments in civil society, where people without care
responsibilities would ‘join parents and others in democratic, self-managed care
work activities’ (Fraser, 1997: 61−2). These ideas bring new ways of resolving
dilemmas between work and care, bringing men into care and generating new
organisations in civil society. But are there limits to what can be achieved at
this level, particularly in CEE countries, with newly developing civil society and
extreme pressures on money and time?
Finally, a dual earner–dual carer model of gender, based on citizenship,
would bring gender equality in employment, emphasising equal access to jobs
in quality and quantity: a two x three-quarter earner model instead of one
and a half. It would bring men into care work in households, but would also
recognise households’ need for social provision. Analyses of gender models have
been developed mainly in Europe (Crompton, 1999; Lewis, 2001b) but the most
developed account is Gornick and Meyers’ (2003) synthesis of European policies
for an US audience. They argue for children to be seen as a social good, needing
to be socially supported to avoid non-parents’ free-riding on parents, through
policies for parental leave, regulating working hours and quality social care for
children. These ideas draw from European states, and could be further developed
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in the wider Europe, where a major tranche of states have a tradition and continu-
ing practice of social investment in children quality childcare. We will argue that
the evidence of gender equality policies in practice highlights the need for policies
involving collective provision across different dimensions of gender regimes.
Current practice offers a variety of approaches, with only Scandinavian
versions approaching gender equality across paid work, care work, income, time
and voice. Scandinavian women’s full-time work – or long part-time hours –
are combined with social care outside the family: there are consequences in
occupational segregation, with women in public sector occupations, but low
gender pay gaps and greater equality of work within households. In the US,
women’s full-time work is supported mainly by privatised care, with many
consequences for time and the quality of care, as well as deep social divisions
in work (Gornick and Meyer, 2003). In Germany, the Netherlands and the UK,
the emphasis – despite some change − is on women’s part-time work covering
care, bringing major gender differences across all dimensions. In CEE countries,
care needs have been reduced by falling birthrates: the highest total fertility rate
among CEE countries is Poland’s at 1.4, while the lowest is the Czech Republic
at 1.1 (UNICEF, 2001: 128). CEE countries retain social care for three to six year
olds, but public policy is male dominated and assumes women as carers, making
women’s employment insecure, and using parental rights risky. In the US, unequal
incomes bring unequal care, in the UK unequal time brings unequal incomes,
and in CEE countries unequal voice brings unequal security of work.
Policies for gender equality drawn from a variety of countries in Europe,
and from the policy literature, are mapped in Figure 1, across different levels of
policy intervention identified above, at individual, household, civil society and
collective levels. Many gender equality policies are aimed primarily at individuals,
to change individual women’s ability to compete with men at work. The literature
and the policy environment show a growing awareness of the need to intervene
at the household level, with policies to enable households to manage care, and
particularly to encourage men to engage in care. Civil society is a crucial source
of political change in CEE countries, and also an important provider of care
in some western countries. Policies at the collective level allow resources to be
shared between households as well as within them.
Gender equality policies are also mapped in Figure 1, across the essential
elements of gender systems: their allocations of paid work, care work, income
and time, and voice, between men and women and between households and the
state. We draw on Creighton’s argument about the decline of the breadwinner
model, whose analysis of the systemic nature of the model argues the widespread
implications of its decline, but we follow this through into a systematic analysis
of policies (Creighton, 1999). We also draw on Daly’s mapping of care policies,
but focusing on care rather than on gender (Daly, 2001, 2002). We will argue that
gender equality policies have been limited in effect, because they have addressed
380 gillian pascall and jane lewis
Figure 1. Policies for gender equality.
part of the system rather than the whole: in particular, individual women’s
possibilities for equal earning. But gender regimes are interconnected systems,
through which paid work is connected to unpaid work, state services and benefits
are delivered to individuals or households, costs are allocated, and time is shared
between men and women in households, as well as between households and
employment. If gender equality policies are to be more effective in delivering equal
treatment, in paid work and welfare, they need to address the interconnecting
elements of gender regimes as systems, with a logic of gender equality in care work,
income, time and voice, as well as in paid employment. This means developing
an environment favouring more equal shares between men and women in paid
work, care work, income, time, and voice, between individuals within households
and in paid work and politics.
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First some caveats: different contexts may bring different consequences.
Part-time work may be a strategy for bringing women into the labour market
and shaking traditional assumptions about women’s roles (as recently in the
Netherlands) or for marginalising them (as in the UK) (Fagan, 2001). Quotas for
representing women in parliaments have been used for women in Scandinavia,
but have been damaging in former communist countries as part of the communist
state. Some policies will be robust in different circumstances, but any assessment
needs to be sensitive to circumstance, and to the detail of implementation. Second,
some policies on the map could be classified in different ways: for example, leave
policies could be seen primarily as creating time for childcare, or as enabling
attachment to work. Finally, the levels of intervention have been arranged
from individual, through household, civil society and collective/state. This
enables us to distinguish between policies aimed at enabling women to keep doing
paid and unpaid work, such as maternal leave, and those aimed at encouraging
sharing, such as paid Daddy leave: but payment for Daddy leave goes to individual
men, who may or may not share it with partners/wives. We have used the four-
fold classification in order to distinguish between policies that are aimed at
individual women and those aimed at households, and in order to represent
the importance of civil society in developing CEE politics, as well as some care
provision. But we argue that the most important division is between policies
which rely on households to produce gender equality, and those that acknowledge
the importance of the wider society, particularly at the collective level.
Paid work
Legislation to outlaw sex discrimination, to give women, as individuals, equal
access to jobs, backed by the courts, has played a role in bringing women into
the labour market on more equal terms with men in some countries of Western
Europe. It has been important to women’s independence within relationships and
survival outside. In CEE countries under communism career breaks and re-entry
to work enabled mothers to move freely between work and family obligations,
while parental leave under market conditions brings the risk of discrimination
against women. Flexible work individually controlled could mean increasing both
parents’ control over schedules, but flexibility has tended to belong to employers
(Bettio et al., 2000).
Where parents are accommodating care, gender differences in labour market
attachment, continuity and flexibility are much more evident. Across the EU 15,
71 per cent of working age men are in employment compared with 51 per cent
of women. That 33 per cent of women in employment are working part-time
compared with 6 per cent of men suggests that women still accommodate unpaid
family work (Eurostat, 2000: 34; Bettio et al., 2000; Fagan et al., 2001; Hakim,
2000; Rubery et al., 1998a, 1998b, 1999). Men’s lifetime earnings are higher than
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their partners’: in the UK among couples with children – on average – women’s
earnings are half men’s (Rake, 2000). Equality at work could mean equal access to
quality jobs, with equality of labour market attachment , to enable households to
share both paid and unpaid work. Rhetoric across the EU supports reconciling
work and family, but few policies aim to share work more equally between men
and women, unless to bring women into the labour market on the same terms as
men. (Policies around part-time work and parental leave are discussed below.)
Such policies could offer men and women a prospect of time and flexibility for
reconciling work and family, and developing civil society. Men would also have
time to care, though it might take more than time to persuade them to do so.
Equal pay legislation has brought a measure of gender equality in full-time
employment, where women’s work matches men’s, especially among younger,
more highly educated women: across the EU 15, women full-time workers earn
74 per cent of the amount of men full-time workers. Lower pay gaps have been
achieved in Scandinavian and CEE countries, around 80 per cent, where women’s
employment has been underpinned with state services, nursery provision and
parental leave (Eurostat, 2000, 2001a). Labour market policies have brought
women into paid employment across Europe, but the key to more equal treatment
has been a collective approach to care.
Incomes
Women are clearly seeking a more equal opportunity to earn: equal pay, a fairer
share of quality work, decent minimum wage levels, and sufficiency of work for
self-support are crucial to women in individualising societies. The collapse of
work in some CEE countries, especially for women, threatens women’s ability to
earn incomes or pensions, while social investment declines. A return to higher
levels of paid employment must be part of any solution to the position of women
in the post-communist countries.
Policies to bring equal rights to pension and benefit incomes in households
could contribute to gender equality. Women tend now to be seen both as primary
carers and as individuals responsible for earning for themselves, their children
and their own pensions. In the context of the gendered division of care work, equal
pensions resulting from equal lifetime earnings are a distant prospect. Reforms
extending private provision at the expense of the public have tied pensions more
closely to lifetime earnings and ‘threaten to magnify gender inequality in later life
income’ (Ginn et al., 2001: 230). Social insurance systems need radical change if
they are to recognise care work as civic duty equally with paid employment and
recompense care with contributory benefits. Splitting pension rights on divorce is
already the practice in Germany and the UK. A more radical option would split
pension rights annually, as in Switzerland: ‘half of the husband’s pot would be
tipped each year into the wife’s pot, and half of the wife’s pot would be tipped
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each year into the husband’s pot’ (Barr, 2001: 150). This would acknowledge
the differential impact of care work on men’s and women’s lives and reduce its
consequences for income in old age.
For those with care responsibilities and less labour clout than under
communism, access to income is a crucial issue now, east and west. Policies
to bring incomes to carers, such as cash benefits, tax credits, or pension credits for
carers, have hazards: low, conditional incomes, entrenching the gender division
of care work (Daly, 2002: 264). Compensating care through basic income
(Jordan, 1989, 2000) or participation incomes (Atkinson, 1998) would bring a
clearer political recognition and valuation of care as work. These would also
provide a more flexible environment for people’s decisions about combining
paid and unpaid responsibilities. The problems lie with funding sufficiently to
provide a worthwhile income. Participation incomes could form part of a system
aiming to give individuals time to combine paid and unpaid work. Individuals’
opportunities to earn meet only part of the need for income, especially for those
with care responsibilities.
Care work
Women’s sole responsibility – sometimes for 24 hours a day care of vulnerable
young and/or older people – has limited their access to incomes, but also to voice,
inside relationships and out, in civil society and the public sector. The extent of
women joining the labour market – whether in CEE countries or western Europe –
has not been matched by men joining responsibility for work in the household.
The gender division of unpaid work has been seen as a ‘stalled revolution’ in the
USA (Hochschild, 1989) and a ‘care crunch’ in Australia (Hancock, 2002). Broad
international trends show some convergence between men’s and women’s unpaid
work (Gershuny, 2000). But everywhere, women are likely to be primary carers
and manage flexible working lives. Even in social democratic countries, policies
for getting women to do more paid work have been more extensive than policies
for getting men to do unpaid work. In soviet regimes, women were conceived as
workers and brought into the labour force. But this was done by state support
for women’s care work and not by transforming the domestic division of labour.
The European Union scarcely recognises unpaid care work, with gender policies
rooted in a conception of women as an actual or potential workforce in the
market.
But – in the teeth of this broad picture – fathers have come into social policy
and family law dialogues. In post-male breadwinner states it can no longer be
assumed that fatherhood means providing. Partnerships are more negotiated
than they used to be (Lewis, 2001b). Policy debates are still dominated by the
idea that reconciling work and family means improving conditions for women to
do both. But debates around caring fatherhood and parental leave have brought
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some change in some countries (Hobson, 2002; Knijn and Selten, 2002; Lewis,
2002b). Policies to promote men’s share of care work are only beginning, but this
is a crucial part of the jigsaw if women’s care work hours are to be reduced –
especially in CEE countries – care work valued, and paid work shared more
equally between men and women.
Various kinds of parental leave may be seen as enabling women’s labour
market participation or as promoting men’s care work. Under communism, it
was clearly the first: parental leave in CEE countries can in principle be taken
by either parent, but men’s participation remains negligible: often less than 1
per cent (UNICEF, 1999). Now greater insecurity of work makes it more difficult
for either parent to use entitlements (Fodor et al., 2002). Sweden since 1975 has
offered leave to either parent, with generous and flexible benefits, and, again, has
mainly encouraged women’s labour market participation. Most policies enable
women’s labour market participation and improve – to some extent – their access
to independent incomes and their public voice. But taken largely by women, leave
may damage women’s labour market position, promote their labour market exit,
entrench their caring roles, and exempt fathers. Unpaid leave is not affordable for
poorer parents. Men are unlikely to take leave unless it is paid (Moss and Deven,
1999).
Parental leave that is paid, shared between men and women and combined in
a wider environment of policies for gender equality in work and family, may, as in
Norway and Sweden, begin to challenge traditional parenting roles (Leira, 1999).
Daddy leave, a period of paid leave designated for fathers, is the first significant
policy to change men into carers, rather than women into workers. Among
Swedish children born in 1995, 77 per cent had fathers who used the whole month
then available. Swedish fathers still take much less leave than Swedish mothers
and maternal care remains a norm (Bjornberg, 2002). But research suggests that
taking parental leave affects men’s thinking about work and family and their
subsequent participation in childcare (Haas and Hwang, 1999). Now Sweden has
two months Daddy leave, and Italy has introduced incentives to men to take a
larger share of the (partially paid) parental leave: fathers who take three months
parental leave bring an extra month’s entitlement (Krause, 2003).
In countries lacking public childcare services, such as the US and the UK, the
development of market care services has enabled better-off parents to combine
paid work and family. Relying on markets means that gender equality is likely to
be a privilege (nearly) attained by better-off women – as currently in the UK –
where reliance on the private sector has led to contrasting patterns: more highly
educated women pay for childcare and develop continuous careers whereas the
less highly educated return after childcare to low-paid part-time jobs and suffer a
huge loss of income. Integrated childcare and education services, on a universal
basis, and ‘long-term investment by Government’ are needed to change this in the
UK (Land, 2002a: 12; Rake, 2000). The voluntary sector has some importance in
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care services, but generally lacks the capacity for childcare to underpin women’s
labour market participation. All these underline the importance of the state in
regulating, funding and providing early childcare services.
State care services may be seen as social commitment to children and disabled
or older people. But under conditions of gender inequality in paid and unpaid
work – which are likely to persist – they may also be seen as compensation for
women’s unpaid care work, through redistribution from earners. They set limits
to care responsibility for individuals, moderating unpaid work, and giving time
for paid work, for carers to earn incomes and pensions. They have been crucial
to women’s high labour market access in Sweden and in Central Europe. Some
aspects of CEE social policy regimes have survived the upheavals: ‘A long history
of low income inequality, combined with a tradition of investment in the social
sectors in general and in children and the family in particular, have left a lasting
mark’ (Micklewright and Stewart, 2000). Unless care is underpinned with public
services, gender equality will belong to the better off. Secure care involves state
provision as well as state and EU regulation.
EU policy about reconciling work and family includes a Council
Recommendation on Childcare covering principles for care services, leave
arrangements, workplace changes and men’s participation in care (1992) and
the Parental Leave Directive (1996). There is therefore ‘a common agenda for
European early childhood policy: a legal right to maternity and parental leave;
public support for working parents; and public support for a period of early
education available to all children before they start school’ (Moss, 2001: 10).
But implementation is varied (Cohen, 1999), there is more soft law through
the Open Method of Co-ordination than firm directive, and the EU – along
with national governments – has done more to bring women into paid work
than men into care (Neilson, 1998; Mazey, 1998; Walby, 1999; Ostner and Lewis,
1995; Ostner, 2000; Rossilli, 1999, 2000; Hantrais, 2002b). Former communist
countries have lost subsidised educational and cultural services for children out
of school hours. High-quality services for children of all ages – and equal access
to paid employment for mothers − are unlikely to be guaranteed without state
involvement in regulation and provision (Gornick and Meyer, 2003).
Time
Whatever the convergence between countries, between men and women, and
between social classes (Gershuny, 2000) the distribution and meaning of time
remain profoundly gendered. In CEE countries, women have paid a high price
for their jobs in hours of paid and unpaid work and little leisure, in the context
of a lack of part-time work, and long working hours (Paoli and Parent-Thirion,
2003). The male breadwinner model leaves residues in most western countries
of differences in working hours, part-time work, rewards from work, and the
balance of work and care responsibilities. Men prioritise paid work, leaving
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women to manage flexible part-time work and family responsibility. This pattern
contributes to gender inequality and to undervaluing care as a marginal activity,
hidden in private life. Social policies – unregulated working time, inflexible
male-style working life patterns, maternity leave, benefits systems based on a
male worker model of employment – have often supported these differences. But
social policies also offer routes to transform the gendering of time. To achieve
this, they would need to address the quantity of working time, its distribution
between men and women, and between households, as well as autonomy for
individuals to control working time in the interests of care and leisure. Time
policies for care of elderly or disabled people are particularly under-developed
(Daly, 2002: 258−9). These are key issues if welfare is for well-being, rather than
just work and wages (Lewis, 2002a).
Flexibility and fairness are targeted in policies of equal value for part-
time work, supported by the European Directive on Part-time Working, and
by legislation against discrimination between employees based on working hours
in the Netherlands. Dutch women’s part-time work is on a fairer basis than
in the UK, where women’s part-time work is particularly poorly valued (Fagan,
2001; Grimshaw and Rubery, 2001; Plantenga, 2002). These policies should enable
households to negotiate, adapt and share working hours more equally. But policies
have been more focused on changing women’s use of time than on changing
men’s. In the Netherlands, women’s move into part-time work has been rapid,
but the official Dutch ideal of a combination model for both sexes is still far from
reality. Men’s part-time work has increased, but as young and older workers,
rather than as parents (Plantenga et al., 1999; Plantenga 2002). These policies
have served to bring it into line with the Western European norm of a one and a
half worker pattern, with women as the half, rather than transforming the gender
division of time.
Time control in households is crucial for carers of young children, disabled
or elderly people, who are unlikely to make themselves available for work that
imposes uncertainty or inflexibility: households need control over flexibility
and autonomy to manage time, while being responsive to and responsible for
vulnerable members. The transformation of work could make space for flexible
working enabling households to mesh family work with paid employment. But
flexible working has tended to work for firms rather than for individuals, and to
undermine households’ capacity for safe and consistent care: ‘A renegotiation
of the time-based employment contract can be identified as an essential
prerequisite for a new gender contract . . . a lifecycle approach to flexible working
time . . . would allow eventual change in the distribution of parenting work’
(Bettio et al., 2000: 148). School scheduling to match work times, holiday and
after-school services, family leave, flexible parental leave, working time based
on flexi-years – these could all be extended to maximise people’s control over
their own working lives (Gershuny, 2000). Time convergence policies in tax and
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benefit systems would undermine a key reason for the failure of gender equality
policies. National taxation and social security policies and overtime regulations
could offer incentives to move away from unequal one-and-a-half patterns in
Western Europe. This might involve incentives to employers and employees,
especially men, through insurance contributions favouring intermediate hours;
or individualising taxation systems to discourage differentiated gender roles
(Bettio et al., 2000: 154).
A shorter working week would give men time for care, women access to
paid work and both space for children. Europe’s Working Time Directive offers
a maximum of 48 hours and makes a beginning. There is evidence of some
convergence between men and women (Gershuny, 2000) and more evidence
that men and women in EU states would welcome more convergence, reducing
men’s tendency to long working hours, and women’s tendency to short part-time,
preferring a working week around 37 hours, near the current average working
week for all workers of 38 hours (Fagan et al., 2001; Bielenski et al., 2002).
In Western Europe, shorter working hours would close the gap between part-
time and full-time employment, reduce the segregation of the labour market and
challenge long-hours culture (Creighton, 1999). The working time regimes in CEE
countries differ from those in Western Europe: CEE workers have longer hours,
at an average of 44, with few part-timers (Paoli and Parent-Thirion, 2003: 45).
In CEE countries, shorter working hours for men could bring women out of
unemployment, sharing employment within and between households. France has
the strongest policy for the shorter working week, with a maximum of 35hours, in-
troduced to share work between households, but enjoyed in France for its family-
friendly consequences (Boulin, 2000; Fagnani, 2002a, 2002b). Denmark has a
collectively agreed 37-hour full-time week, and Belgium a maximum of 39 hours
(EIRO, 2002). Reducing the maximum working week could be a strong policy
for gender equality, sharing work between men and women and reducing
poverty by spreading work, working within households as well as between
them. Policies to hasten time convergence between men and women, within and
between households – in contrast to policies enabling women to cover care −
would offer gender equality in time for work, care, civil society and public politics.
Voice
Equal opportunities machinery, offering individuals rights to claim equal pay and
opportunities through recourse to the courts, has brought important rights to
individuals. But still, inequalities in paid work, care, income and time bring
unequal voice in households, civil society, local politics, state and European
governments. In households, the continuing gender division of labour suggests
that women’s voice is weaker, and their lower incomes may give them less say in
major decisions than men. Household decision-making processes appear to be
connected to wider structures of labour markets and welfare states, as well as to
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gender ideologies and inequalities of power within the household (Morris, 1990).
The evidence suggests the need for looking to, but also beyond, women’s paid
employment, for sources of change in the voice of women in households and
their ability to affect household spending and the domestic division of labour.
Welfare states can encourage equality within households by policies that support
equality outside it.
Developing social movements are also significant for representing women’s
interests and for gender equality. The emergence of collective action by carers has
brought issues of care from individuals in households into public politics in the
west, bringing collective identity, recognition and policy development (Barnes,
2001). Under communism, the lack of civil society and women’s action within it
brought a wide gap between public equality and domestic tradition, and its lack
now exposes the gains of the communist era in women’s position in public life.
Equal opportunities machinery is limited in CEE countries (UNICEF, 1999: 106).
It will be difficult for women to know their rights without extensive development
of local legal advice and national organisations.
Women’s representation in government and politics is generally low: for
example, in Western Europe the representation of women in parliaments is
currently around 15 per cent. The Nordic countries manage much more at 39 per
cent. It has taken the UK 84 years, from when some women were first allowed
to vote in 1918 to reach a parliamentary representation at Westminster of 18.2
per cent, a level that undermines representation itself (Phillips, 1991, 1998).
Under communism in the 1980s, quotas brought women’s representation in
parliaments to around 30 per cent. But gender equality was owned by the
communist state rather than by women themselves, and women’s position in
parliaments gave them little political power. The suppression of civil society
inhibited the development of a women’s movement. Gender equality in CEE
countries has been contaminated by communism: transition from communism
brought a drop in women’s representation in parliaments to around 5 per cent.
Development of civil society during the transition period may have brought
more real involvement in local government, NGOs and grassroots economic and
political activities and a gender politics of the household. But the new political
structures in CEE countries are more male dominated than the old (UNICEF,
1999: 93–108; Pascall and Manning, 2000).
If these political conditions owe a lot to gender inequalities in paid work, care,
income and time they, in turn, undermine representation of these issues. Women
need a voice for caring issues in formal, informal, national and international
contexts (Lister, 1997: 202; Siim, 2000). International bodies agree the need to
represent women fully in democratic processes, through the UN’s Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979 (UNICEF,
1999: vii) and through a Council of European Union Recommendation calling on
member states to increase representation of women in decision-making positions
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(Squires and Wickham-Jones, 2001: 1–5). But soft law has not put serious pressure
on national governments. Accumulated evidence suggests that discriminatory
political processes are the key to the weak representation of women – rather,
for example, than women’s choices or poorer qualification for election (Elgood
et al., 2002; Phillips, 1991). More representative government in Scandinavian
countries has been achieved through proportional representation, quotas, the
strength of women’s organisations in the parties and a shifting public−private
divide. These have formed a cycle that improves women’s situations in politics
and households (Phillips, 1991). These changes are more deep-rooted in Nordic
countries than elsewhere. But in May 2000, France regulated the proportion
of women candidates in local, regional and European elections, though not in
parliamentary ones. This ‘parity law’ produced a dramatic increase in women’s
representation from 22 per cent to 47.5 per cent in the cities in March 2001
(Squires and Wickham-Jones, 2001). The parity principle suggests that the
representativeness of political institutions could be improved radically and
rapidly, if the Council of Europe were to turn recommendation into directive
to member states to increase women’s representation in Europe itself, and in
national and local assemblies, following France’s lead and taking it further,
disseminating good practice. Representative government, fully including women,
would bring better prospect of gender equality in work, incomes, time and care,
with consequences within households and between them.
Conclusion
There is no single magic policy for gender equality. Rather, the gender
assumptions underpinning economic and social policies need to be examined
very widely and the interconnections of paid and unpaid work, income, time and
voice acknowledged. Policies directed at paid work have been very successful in
some countries and under some conditions: they have increased women’s access
to incomes for themselves and their children, and to pensions; they have given
women more voice in relationships and in public politics. They are still needed to
reduce men’s incentives to work longer hours than their wives/partners. But even
in the most favourable countries, women earn less than men: gender equality
in the labour market alone is unattainable, because of systemic connections to
inequalities in families, politics and civil society.
Mapping gender equality policies has also raised the question of interventions
at different levels, from individual, through household, civil society and state.
Policies enabling individual women to achieve equality with individual men –
policies against sex discrimination, for parental leave, for equal opportunities –
have brought women into the labour market and supported their ability to care for
children. For women with higher education they have brought well-paid work and
the capacity to pay for care. But they have created diversity in labour markets and
in households, with gender equality accessible only to advantaged women. They
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have also brought gender equality to women on men’s terms, enabling women
to balance work and family, but offering no challenge to men to do the same.
The Dutch Combination Scenario offers a new vision of households in
which men look after children too, discouraging men’s free-riding on care work.
Social value for unpaid work, community work and child-rearing lie behind the
Dutch ‘post-productivist’ regime: it brings choice to households over reducing
and sharing working time, time autonomy to individuals, adequate incomes, and
strong economic growth (Goodin, 2001). Its ideals of gender equality go beyond
other models, in their relation to time and value for unpaid work as well as paid.
The ‘Combination Scenario’ and Fraser’s ‘universal caregiver’ models expect
too much of households and civil society, rather than governments, moving
care towards private and informal paid care, not supported by public provision
(Knijn, 2001). In CEE countries civil society is developing, but not developed,
and long working hours leave little time for creating new community services. A
policy environment aiming to give people more equal time to care for themselves
and others might lead to lower spending levels than in the social democratic
and former communist regimes, and make the gender equality aspects of these
regimes more transportable – addressing the ‘Achilles heel’ of the Nordic approach
(Esping-Andersen et al., 2001: 25, 2002). But we have no evidence yet of regimes
producing gender equality without significant public expenditure and provision.
There are social class and age differences in the ability of households to
support care work, to which a response at the level of collective services and
transfers is needed. A gender model that aims for more equal incomes between
men and women must acknowledge the needs of those who have prioritised care,
accommodating the choices of women made within moral and policy contexts
that made the ‘choice’ of self-support surrender to the ‘choice’ of care (Hakim,
2000). Household-level policies, designed to share pensions or time more equally,
can make a contribution to policy, but a wider context of collective services and
transfers will produce wider gender equality.
The significance of collective provision is evidenced by those regimes that
have actually produced a degree of gender equality, especially Scandinavian and
CEE countries. Their more egalitarian legislation and smaller gender differences
in pay, incomes and household time have been achieved in part through public
expenditure and commitment to collective care. If citizens have responsibilities
for care and responsibilities for work, they also need the rights to support care.
These rights have been achieved through redistributive policies countering gender
discrimination in employment and supporting care work when carers are not
supported by or joined to breadwinners.
An inclusive citizenship version of the dual earner–dual carer model would
create a policy environment encouraging gender equality in paid work, care work,
income, time and voice, while offering social support for care and for work. It
would aim to share quality work between men and women, replacing the one
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and a half earner model developing in much of western Europe with a two x
three-quarter model, and to re-establish full employment for women in CEE
countries, while reducing long working hours. Social policies would assume that
men and women equally need to earn for their own security and should have
equal obligation to care for children and others. Policies for equal pay would
be joined by policies for sharing quality work, to increase equalities of incomes
and security. Regulating full-time work – through reducing full-time hours −
and sharing it between men and women would give time for both to share
unpaid work, while education, benefit, taxation and pay policies support equal
care. Greater equality of voice for men and women in households and in public
politics could be fostered by changes in political processes. A model equalising
paid work, care work, income, time and voice would build the necessary links
between care and income which have been severed by recent trends. It would allow
people as individuals to support themselves while finding time for commitment
to family. But neither households, nor civil society, can create gender equality or
reconcile individualism with the need for care without collective commitments
to children and others. The best prospect for gender equality in the new Europe
is a model in which people’s obligations to paid work and care as citizens would
be underpinned with public investment in citizenship rights.
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